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government can do this is the use of tax liens on property, three types of
which have been discussed. The nature of these liens is such that it is
not always easy to determine when they exist. The question of whether
or not the government holds a lien is one with many ramifications, and
those concerned with examining title to property must -be wary lest they
find themselves entangled in one of them. The various matters which
must be considered in determining whether or not a lien exists require a
thorough understanding of the manner in which they arise and are
extinguished as well as their duration. These factors cannot be summarily
dismissed, and to lay some of the stepping stones to arrive at a satisfactory
conclusion has been the purpose of this article.
Charles R. Leech, Jr.
COMMON CARRERs-DuTY TO SERvE
STRIKEBOUND SHIPPER
The plaintiff, a shipper sought damages from railroad for failing
to switch in cars to its plant, while plant was under strike and picketed
by its employees. The district court allowed plaintiff damages. On appeal
by railroad, held, affirmed on the law, but remanded for redetermination
of damages. Railroad has duty to provide service upon reasonable request.
49 U.S.C.A. §1 (4). Shipper must expressly request cars even though he
knows request may be futile where the tariff prescribes that orders must
be given for any cars desired. Damages are allowable to the shipper on
basis of actual reasonable requests with which carrier failed to comply.
Minneapolis and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 215
F. 2d 126, (8th Cir. 1954).
The shippers suit was based on the duty to provide cars under §184
of the Interstate Commerce Act. 36 STAT. 545 (1910), as amended. 49
U.S.C. §1(4) (1946). This statute is declaratory of every carrier's
common law duty. Lucking v. Detroit & C. Navigation Co., 273 Fed.
577 (E.D. Mich. 1921); Farmer's Grain Co. v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R.,
66 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. I1. 1946); 10 CORPUS JURUs, CARIERs §66.
At common law a carrier was obligated to accept and transport all
commodities which it held itself out to transport and further to serve all
persons without unreasonable advantage to any. Jackson v. Rogers,
2 Shaw (K.B.) 327, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (1695); Coggs v. Bernard,
2 Ld. Raymond 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703); Gibbon v. Paynton,
4 Burr. 2298, 98 Eng. Rep. 199 (1769); Niagara v. Cordes, 21
Howard 2, 62 L.Ed. 41 (1858). The essentials of the common law
duty are to receive, carry, and deliver goods. Wabash Railroad v. Pierce,
192 U.S. 179 (1904). At common law, a verbal request for service
indicated goods were to be transported and imposed a duty. Bell v.
Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 163 N.C. 180, 79 S.E. 421 (1913).
At early common law, the carrier was excused from his duty only
in the event of an act of God or interference by enemies of the king.
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Even overwhelming force which the carrier could not resist did not
excuse. Coggs v. Bernard, supra. In effect, liability was absolute. Garside
v. Trent & Mersey Navigation, 4 T.R. 581, 100 Eng. Rep. 1187
(1792). As allowed by tariffs of today, the carrier could limit the
nature of the goods it would carry, where goods would be accepted and
delivered, and time and frequency of journeys. Bodine & Clark Live-
stock Commission Co. v. Great Northern Railway Co., 62 F. 2d 472
(9th Cir.), cert den, 290 U.S. 629 (1933).
There are deviations from the strict view of absolute liability. In
Pennsylvania Rd. Co. v. Puritan Coal Company, 237 U.S. 121 (1915),
it is stated that the carrier's liability either by statute or at common law
is not absolute. Carriers have been excused when there was an unfore-
seeable shortage of cars, Midland Valley Ry. Co. v. Barkley, 276 U.S.
482 (1928), when there was a sudden and great demand for service
which the carrier had no reason to expect and which it could not reason-
ably meet, Pennsylvania Rd. Co. v. Puritan Coal Co., supra, St. Louis
Ry. Go. v. Laser Grain Co., 120 Ark. 119, 79 S.W. 189 (1915),
when the freight was dangerous or prohibited, New York Central Rd.
Go. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall 357, 21 L. Ed. 627 (1873), and when the
goods were injurious to public health, peace, and morals. Coweta County
v. Central of Georgia, 4 Ga. App. 94, 60 S.E. 1018 (1908).
A strike on the carrier's line, provided the carrier did not induce or
encourage the strike, excused it from common law duty. Gage v. Arkansas
Central Ry. Co., 160 Ark. 402, 254 S.W. 665 (1923). But where the
carrier did not give the shipper timely notice that strike would prevent
providing service, liability was imposed. Warner v. St. Louis-San Fran-
cisco Ry. Co., 218 Mo. App. 314, 274 S.W. 90 (1925). See, Eastern
Railway Co. of New Mexico v. Littleford, 237 U.S. 140 (1915). Such
excused status is attainable only if negotiations and mediations are
carried on to fullest extent in attempt to fulfill the carrier's obligation
to the public. Farmer's Grain Co. v. Toledo, Peoria & Western Ry. Co.,
158 F. 2d 109 (2nd Cir. 1946). (On cert. to S. Ct., judgment vacated
and case remanded to district court with direction to dismiss on motion
of respondent.) 332 U.S. 748 (1947).
Prior to the principal case the cases with respect to a carrier's duty
to serve a strikebound shipper were in conflict. Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. Northern Pacific Terminal Co., 23 CCH LAB. LAw REP. 167713,
32 LRRM 2386 (D. Ct. Ore. 1953), indicates that the duty is absolute.
The court stated it was essential that the common law duty be preserved
and held that a carrier's absolute liability for breach of its common law
duty is not affected by labor disputes, nor is the duty modified by present
labor policy.
The contrary view recognized that absolute liability imposes an
undue harshness and responsibility on the carrier. Murphy Hardware Co.
v. Southern Railway, 150 N.C. 703, 64 S.E. 873 (1909). Gage v.
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Arkansas Central Ry. Co., supra. In the federal courts this view was
expressed by the district court in the principal case. Pacific Gamble
Robinson Ca. v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 105 F. Supp. 794
(D. Ct. Minn. 1952). That court recognized that the carrier's duty to
furnish cars was not absolute but turned upon a reasonable request.
Accord, In Re Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 23 LRRM 2135 (E.D. Mo.
1948). Several decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission reflect
this view. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Consolidated Freightways Inc.,
42 M.C.C. 225 (I.C.C., 1943). Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Chicago,
M., St. P. & P.R.R., 268 I.C.C. 257 (1947).
The court of appeals in the principal case rejects the rule of absolute
liability. In substance, the court conceded that evidence of past violent
acts by the striking union, of the carrier's employees fear for safety of
themselves and their families, and of union interference -with carrier's
attempt to serve shipper, may justify prima facie the conclusion that the
request for service was unreasonable. On the other hand, there was con-
siderable contrary evidence: (1) The carrier's policy was to avoid friction
with the union, and the employees were aware that the carrier would not
force them to perform switching services. (2) There was no real indi-
cation of threatened physical harm on the basis of present conduct of
strike. (3) A state injunction prohibited interference with switching
operatiois and ordered the railroad to perform its duty. (4) No effort
was made to invoke the protective powers of the law. And finally, (5)
the carrier's criteria of its duty was entirely guided by union wishes since
the carrier took no affirmative steps to comply with its statutory duty.
Under these circumstances, the finding that the carrier, in fact, had
failed to provide service on a reasonable request was supported by sufficient
evidence and therefore approved by the court of appeals.
The reasonable request rule is consistent with the modified common
law duty. This rule reaches a more equitable result than the doctrine of
absolute duty as expressed in the Montgomery Watd case, in which the
court stated the carrier must take the risk of bankruptcy. During the last
quarter century much legislation -has been enacted both federal and state
which has allowed unions greater freedom in organizing and in acting
concertedly in achieving its ends. The strike, under prescribed circum-
stances, is recognized as a proper incident of concerted activity. The
court in the principal case must have taken notice of these facts and
determined that the carrier's duty to serve should not be absolute, since
this would place much of the risk of a management-labor dispute upon
the carrier. The principal case should serve as a practical guide for
determining what combination of circumstances will justify refusing to
serve a strike bound shipper.
Several corrolary problems can be raised. When should a mandatory
injunction be issued ordering a carrier to provide service? An essential
element of the carrier's common law duty being delivery to the consignee,
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what is the carrier's duty to effect delivery to a strikebound consignee?
It is suggested that because the same policy factors are present, the
reasonable request doctrine should also be applicable to these situations.
Donald W. Wiper, Jr.
INSUNcE-ToRT LIABILITY-DELAY IN ACTING
UPON AN APPLICATION
Plaintiff applied for family poliomyelitis insurance, giving the in-
surance agent $10.00 as full payment on a two year policy. According
to the application plaintiff signed, coverage was to become effective on
the date of the policy. The application was forwarded to defendent
insurance company where a policy covering "poliomyelitis which first
manifests itself after the effective date" of the policy was issued nine
days after the date of the application. Two of plaintiff's children became
affected with the disease the day before the effective date of the policy.
Plaintiff conceded defendant was under no contractual obligation, but
sued in tort, claiming the face value of the policy as damages for the
insurance company's failure to act upon the application within a reason-
able time. The common pleas court directed a verdict for defendant.
The court of appeals first reversed and remanded the case, then, finding
its decision in conflict with Jekubow v. Prudential Ins. Co., 28 Ohio L.
Abs. 353 (1934), ordered the case to be certified to the Supreme Court
of Ohio. Held, a verdict was rightly directed for defendant. An insurer
has no duty to act upon an insurance application within a reasonable time.
Patten v. Continental Casualty Co., 162 Ohio St. 18, 120 N.E. 2d 441
(1954).
Recovery in tort for failure to act upon an insurance application
within a reasonable time has often been denied, as it was in the principal
case, because of the difficulty in justifying the imposition of a duty upon
the insurance company to act promptly on the application. Placing the
defendant in a position where he has a legal duty to act is a basic require-
ment of tort liability for negligent failure to act. Heaven v. Pender,
11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883), PROSSER, Tom~s §30a (1941); see Green,
The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COL. L. REV. 1014, 29
COL. L. REV. 255. As pointed out by the principal case, an application
for insurance is an offer for an insurance contract. See VANCE, INSURANCE
§35 (3d. ed. 1951). Thus, looking at the fundamental issue of the prob-
lem, tort liability is sought to be imposed if the offeree does not act upon
the offer within a reasonable time. Ordinarily, contract law imposes no
such duty on the offeree, Swentusky v. Prudential Ins. Co., 116 Conn.
526, 165 Ad. 686 (1933); where no time is fixed in the offer, the offer
simply expires after a reasonable length of time has elapsed so that
acceptance cannot be made thereafter. Mactier's Adm'rs. v. Firth,
6 Wend. 103, 21 Am. Dec. 262 (N.Y. 1830), 1 RESTATEMENT, CON-
TRACTS §40 (1932).
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However, recovery in tort for failure to act upon the application in
a reasonable time is allowed in some jurisdictions when the offer is an
application for insurance and the defendant a life or health insurance
company. Harding v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 188 So. 177 (La.
App., 1939); Dyer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 132 Wash. 378,
232 P. 346 (1925), aff'd. on rehearing, 135 Wash. 693, 236 P. 807
(1925). The Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Carter v. Manhattan Life
Insurance Co. 11 Hawaii 69 (1897), was the first court to allow re-
covery, applying the rule of equity "that that which ought to have been
done is done," but the leading case imposing a duty on the insurer to act
upon- an application in a reasonable time is Duffie v. Bankers Life Ass'n.
of Des Moines, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N.W. 1087 (1913). The court at
page 27 (139 N.W. 1090) emphasizing that insurance companies operate
under a franchise from the state, said:
Having solicited applications for insurance, and having so ob-
tained them and received payment of the fees or premiums
extracted, they are 'bound either to furnish the indemnity the
state has authorized them to furnish or decline so to do within
such reasonable time as will enable them to act intelligently
and advisedly thereon or suffer the consequences flowing from
their neglect so to do.
The Duffle decision Was adopted by some courts, Security Ins. Co. v.
Cameron, 85 Old. 171,205 P. 151 (1922); De Fordv. New York Life
Ins. Co. 75 Colo. 146, 224 P. 1049 (1924), and repudiated by others.
Significant among the latter is Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co., 154
Miss. 89, 121 So. 487 (1929) which rejected the Duffle case on the
ground that the franchise granted to an insurance company was no
different than that granted to a bank, which dearly had no duty to lend
money promptly to all those who apply and suffer loss while the bank
was negligent in acting on the offer for a contract..
With respect to hail insurance, Kukuska v. Home Mut. Hail-
Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235 N.W. 403 (1931), found a duty
to act speedily and held that violation of that duty created a quasi-
contractual liability; however, the same court in Wallace v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 212 Wis. 346, 248 N.W. 435 (1933), refused to apply
the Kukuska case to life insurance and denied recovery for the reason that
plaintiff had failed to show damages. The peculiar bargaining position of
the parties to a life insurance contract was used to justify imposition of
a duty to act in Bekken v. Equitable Life Insurance Soc., 70 N.D. 122,
293 N.W. 200 (1940). Strand v. Bankers" Life Ins. Co., 115 Neb. 357,
213 N.W. 349 (1927), treated the insurance agent as a trustee of the
applicant's advance premium, and stressed that an insurance company is
affected with a public interest; however, recovery was denied on the
ground that plaintiff had failed to show an unreasonable delay. But see
Munger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 2 F. Supp. 914 (D.C. Mo. 1933)
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which found the various theories used to impose a duty to act "most
unconvincing." See, to the same effect, Zayc v.-John Hancock Mut. Life
Ins. Co. 338 Pa. 426, 13 A. 2d 34 (1940) and Prosser, Delay in Acting
on at Application for Insurance, 3 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 39 (1935).
Courts in the United States are about evenly split over whether to allow
recovery through one of the legal theories mentioned above, or to reject
all theories of recovery; see cases compiled in 32 A.L.R. 2d 511-539.
The principal case did not discuss specifically any of the legal
theories used by courts allowing recovery in tort, but only referred to the
A.L.R. compilation and Prosser article cited supra. Chief Justice
Weygandt dissented, on the grounds the petition did state a cause of
action. Judge Zimmerman, although concurring with the majority of
the court, indicated he would allow recovery in some situations; he ob-
served that in the principal case the lapse of nine days between execution
of the application and issuance of the policy (which included a three day
holiday over Labor Day weekend) was not an unreasonable delay as a
matter of law. Neither of the judges explained his reason for imposition
of a duty to act upon the insurance application.
The principal case confirmed the holding of the Cuyahoga County
Court of Appeals in Jekubow v. Prudential Insurance Co., 28 Ohio L.
Abs. 353 (1934), although that case was not cited by the supreme court.
In the only other Ohio case where the question of tort recovery for
failure to act upon an insurance application in a reasonable time was
raised, the court avoided ruling on the issue. The plaintiff had sued for
negligent delay of an insurance agent in delivering a life insurance policy,
but also alleged that the agent agreed to furnish life insurance to the
deceased and to the plaintiff, who were partners in the clothing business.
The court analyzed the pleadings as stating a cause of action for breach
of contract by failure to deliver the life insurance policy, with the allega-
tions of negligence and unreasonable delay being "mere surplusage.'
Vesser v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 44 Ohio App. 293, 185 N.E. 565
(1932).
In addition to the tort theories discussed above, attempts have some-
times been made to recover in contract, upon the ground that silence by
the insurance company after receipt of the application and part or all
of the premium implies an acceptance of the application. Thus, in
Columbia Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 P. 255
(1923), the court found that the action was based upon an implied con-
tract. Similarly, recovery has sometimes been allowed upon the theory
that an unreasonable delay presumes acceptance. Witten v. Beacon Life
Ass'n., 225 Mo. App. 110, 33 S.W. 2d 989 (1931). Nevertheless, the
vast majority of jurisdictions do not accept the principal that mere delay
in passing on the insurance application can be construed as acceptance,
National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. School Dist. No. 55, 122 Ark. 179,
182 S.W. 547 (1916); cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Whitman, 75
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Ohio St. 312, 79 -N.E. 459 (1906), in the absence of additional cir-
cumstances indicating an intent to be bound.
The variation and novelty of the approaches used to impose a duty
upon an insurance company to act upon an insurance application in a
reasonable time in those jurisdictions allowing recovery suggest in them-
selves that Ohio has wisely refused to stretch the law of torts to such an
extent. But sound business practice, as well as a sense of fairness, in-
dicate the applicant should be entitled to prompt action by the insurance
company. The answer to the problem is suggested in the syllabus of the
principal case when it rules there is no duty "apart from statute." A
statute which defined exactly how long the insurance company had to
act would give notice to both parties of the conditions under which the
application is made, and avoid putting the defendant insurance company
at the mercy of a jury's interpretation of "unreasonable delay" in acting
on the insurance application. If the statute required action in a period
such as thirty days, provision should be made for notice to the applicant
if a longer period is required for investigation. A precedent for such
a statute may be found in North Dakota, where N.D. Rev. Code
§26-1901 (1943), provides that delay beyond twrenty-four hours con-
stitutes acceptance of a hail insurance application. The constitutionality
of the North Dakota statute was upheld in Natonal Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71 (1922) against attack on the grounds of
violation of the due process, equal protection, and freedom of contract
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. Constitution.
James Richard Hamilton
LEGAL PROFESSiON-DISBARMENT-SOLICITATION
AND MAINTENANCE
Pursuant to the provisions of OHIO REV. CODE §4705.02 (1707),
a committee of three attorneys was appointed by the Court of Common
Pleas of Franklin County to investigate complaints, received by the
Columbus Bar Association, that the respondent had been guilty of mis-
conduct or unprofessional conduct involving moral turpitude. The evi-
dence presented by the committee indicated that the respondent had ob-
tained legal business through paid solicitors, had advanced sums of money
to clients during litigation and had paid one client $500 in order to have
another attorney discharged so that the respondent might be retained.
Respondent's defense was that the conduct outlined by the evidence was
not moral turpitude within the meaning of OHIO REV. CODE §4705.02
(1707). The charges were heard 'by three judges appointed by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio and sitting as the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Franklin County. Held, the conduct engaged in by the
respondent is a violation of Rule 28 of the rules of professional conduct
adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court and as such is unprofessional conduct
involving moral turpitude. In re Dombey, 68 Ohio L. Abs. 34 (1954).
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Solicitation, in and of itself, was not proscribed at common law.
Chreste v. Louisville Ry. Co., 167 Ky. 75, 180 S.W. 49 (1915). It was
not until the latter part of the eighteenth century that competition between
lawyers became common, and with this, arose the problems concerned in
advertising and solicitation. See Drinker, LEGL ETmics at p. 210
(1953). Condemnation of the practice of solicitation came through the
adoption of canons of ethics which, although generally not binding on the
courts, People ex rel Chicago Bar Assn. v. McCallum, 341 Ill. 578,
173 N.E. 827 (1930), do establish wholesome standards of conduct.
In re Cohen, 201 Mass. 484, 159 N.E. 495 (1928). In Ohio, the
Supreme Court has indorsed the Canons of Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association and in Rule 28 has implicitly expressed its
disapproval of solicitation. Sixteen jurisdictions have gone further and
have condemned solicitation by statute. See comment, 52 Col. L. Rev.
1039 (1952). The practice of solicitation through agents and paid
touters has been considered a far more serious form of misconduct than
the personal solicitation of legal business. Chreste v. Louisville Ry. Co.,
supra. There are a number of excellent reasons why solicitation in gen-
eral should be condemned. At first blush it would seem obvious that
solicitation lowers the dignity of the bar and the confidence of the public
and encourages litigation in situations where claims might otherwise be
ignored. In re Greathouse, 189 Minn. 51, 248 N.W. 735 (1933).
However, more compelling objections can be found upon deeper inquiry.
If solicitation were allowed, the least capable and least honest lawyers
would be in a position to make alluring claims about themselves and the
harm which would result would fall upon the ignorant and those least
able to afford it. Further in order to gain employment there would
always be the temptation to hold out as an inducement assurances of
success. The giving of these assurances would lead to the further temp-
tation to use questionable or even illegal means to achieve the promised
result. Hewitt, A Letter to the Editor, 15 A.B.A.J. 116 (1929),
Drinker, op. cit. supra, at p. 212. One could also argue that solicitation
is a means of unfair competition on the part of those who solicit. Another
consideration is that solicitation places a burden on already crowded court
dockets and reduces the possibility of settlement.
Ohio courts are not uninitiated in .the problems of solicitation. The
practice has generally been deprecated, The Akron "Ambulance Chasing"
Inquiry, 26 Ohio L.R. 515 (1928), (attorney was denied a writ of
prohibition against investigation of solicitation); Re Committee on Rule
28 of Cleveland Bar Assn. 15 Ohio L. Abs. 106, 29 N.P. (N.S.) 291
(1932), (held a violation of Rule 28 for attorney to contract with an
organization having a large number of personal injury claims which
constantly solicits business for the attorney); Thatcher v. Meck, 49 Ohio
App. 92, 195 N.E. 254 (1934), (attorney was denied accounting of
partnership funds realized from the profits of solicited cases); In re
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Meck, 51 Ohio App. 237, 200 N.E. 478 (1935), (unprofessional con-
duct warranting suspension or disbarment of an attorney to solicit clients
through runners and advance funds to clients to carry them until termi-
nation of the suit). A. fairly recent California case refused to condone
solicitation but took a tolerant position because of the lack of precedent
and because of the stake of the attorneys involved. Hildebrand v. State
Bar of California, 36 Calif. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950). The courts
are far less lenient where, in addition to solicitation the lawyer has demon-
strated some breach of faith towards his client. Thus, a lawyer who
solicited clients on a contingent fee basis through runners and advanced
costs and expenses to the clients was disbarred when he charged the
clients for fictitious expenses and misrepresented the amount recovered.
Appeal of Maires, 189 Pa. 99, 41 Ad. 988 (1899).
Maintenance is the act of assisting the plaintiff in any legal pro-
ceeding in which the person giving the assistance has no valuable interest,
or in which he acts from any improper motive. Stephen, A DIGEST OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW 99 (1887). In the instant case, although charges
of maintenance are mentioned and evidence discussed, the court is
strangely silent about it. It is indeed unfortunate- that more light was not
cast on this aspect of the case. When a lawyer gains a reputation for
advancing expenses, which can be viewed as a loan without security and
without a burden, since its repayment is dependent on the success of the
litigation, there is undoubtedly an encouragement of the initiation of
litigation. Furthermore with the loan from attorney to client there is an
interest between the two which is non-legal in nature and places an undue
premium on winning the case since this is the only means of repaying the
loan. It should be made clear, however, that the mere loaning of money
to a client is not objectionable, per se. Grievance Comm. of Fairfield
County Bar v. Nevas, 139 Conn. 660, 96 A.2d 802 (1953); In re Sizer,
306 Mo. 356, 267 S.W. 922 (1924). The loan is objectionable when
used as a means of securing a client. There is a statute in OHIO REv.
CODE §2917.43 (12847) which makes it a crime for an attorney at law,
or other officers of the court, to stir up a suit between two or more per-
sons. While indictments under this statute have been at a minimum,
there doesn't appear to be any reason why it could not be extended to
include maintenance. Where such a statute has been extended to in-
clude maintenance and its companion offense champerty it has been
held constitutional. McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920). One
commentator brands a contingent fee when initiated by the lawyer as
maintenance and disapproves of thg practice because remuneration is
placed above the rendering of services in a just cause and because of the
temptation of the lawyer to win his case by unfair means. Taeaush,
Professional and Business Ethics in Hicks, ORGANIZATION AND ETHICS
OF THE BENCH AND BAR 303 (1932). An early Ohio case held that
where an attorney defrays the cost of litigation in return for a moiety of
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what may be recovered it is champerty and maintenance. Key v. Vattier,
1 Ohio 132 (1823). A later case, which is apparently the leading Ohio
case on maintenance, held that such a contract was not champertous,
Reece v. Kyle, 49 Ohio St. 475, 31 N.E. 747 (1892); and it is the gen-
eral view that a contingent fee contract, per se, is not champertous.
Spencer v. King, 5 Ohio 182 (1823), State v. mpt, 6 Ohio Dec. Repr.
699 (1879). But there is a case holding that such a contract is subject to
inquiry and indicates there is a difference when the attorney advances
costs. Zmerican Vitrified Products Co. v. Croaks, 20 Ohio L. Abs. 627
(1935).
The purpose of the disbarment procedure is not to mete out punish-
ment to an individual offender, but to protect the administration of justice.
Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882); Schwartz v. State, 18 Ohio App.
373 (1924). In this way the Zourt can assure the public of a capable and
worthy bar possessed of all the attributes deemed by the profession to be
necessary in a lawyer. One writer argues that a lack of any of these attrib-
utes is a valid reason for disbarment. See comment, 52 Col. L. R. 1039
(1952). The respondent in the instant case was engaging in behavior
defined by the court as unprofessional. The penalty imposed by the court
in the instant case was a one year suspension. It would seem that if the
court wishes to abolish these practices they have ample power to do so
through disbarment proceedings.
Charles D. Hering, Jr.
PERSONAL PROPERTY-JOINT AND SURVIVORSHIP
BANK ACCOUNTSi-RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP
Son and daughter were co-owners of a joint and survivorship ac-
count with a loan and savings institution. The son killed daughter and
was placed in county jail where he subsequently committed suicide. After
a hearing to determine the proper disposition of the funds in the account,
the probate court found in favor of the son's administrator. On appeal,
held, affirmed. The murderer was not divested of his right to the pro-
ceeds of the bank account. Shuman v. Schick, 95 Ohio App. 413, 120
N.E. 2d 330 (1953).
There was no criminal prosecution in this case since the murderer
committed suicide. The court in its opinion referred to OHio REV. CODE
§2105.19 (10503-17) which provides that no person finally adjudged
guilty of murder in the first or second degree shall inherit or take any
part of the real or personal estate of the person killed. The court then
stated, "Since there was no criminal prosecution in this case this statute
has no application." It is submitted that even if the murderer had been
convicted, this statute would not have changed the result, the reason being
that the interest was acquired not from the estate of the deceased joint
owner but by virtue of the contract of deposit with the bank. Vesey v.
Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54 N.W. 2d 385 (1952). Similarly, the court
1955 ]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
of appeals, in Hennigh v. Neff, 27 Ohio L. Abs. 364 (1938) held that
this statute was not applicable in an action by the administrator of a
murdered wife to recover from the husband who killed her the proceeds
of an insurance policy paid to him as beneficiary, since such money was
never part of her estate.
Before enactment of the above statute, Ohio courts -had held that the
murderer did not lose his right to inherit the property of his victim.
Deem v. Mllikin, 3 Ohio Cir. Dec. 491, affirmed, 53 Ohio St. 668, 44
N.E. 1134 (1895). In the instant case the court quoted from Oleff v.
Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838 (1935):
4. The fact that one of the parties to such contract [a
joint and survivor account] murders the other does not divest
the murderer of his right thereto, in the absence of a statute to
that effect.
5. A public policy, however sound, cannot take away
from the individual his vested rights.
The facts in the Oleff case were similar to those in the instant case,
and, although the statute above referred to had not been enacted at the
time of the murder, the supreme court made reference to it, stating,
"... . had section 10503-17, General Code been in effect at that time,
which it was not, it could in no wise have affected his [the murderer's]
rights."
Although joint tenancies with incidental right of survivorship are
not recognized in Ohio, nevertheless parties may contract for joint
ownership with such right. Waltenberger v. Pearson, 81 Ohio App. 51,
77 N.E. 2d 491 (1946); Foraker v. Kocks, 41 Ohio App. 210, 180
N.E. 743 (1931). Such was the situation in the case under discussion
and also in the case of In re Hutchison, 120 Ohio St. 542, 166 N.E. 687
(1929) wherein the supreme court stated, ". . .at the death of one of
the joint owners the survivor succeeds to the title to the entire interest,
not upon the principle of survivorship as an incident to the joint tenancy
but by the operative provisions of the contract ... "
The present case must be distinguished from that of Bauman v.
Walter, 160 Ohio St. 273, 116 N.E. 2d 435 (1953); noted in 15 Onio
ST. L.J. 232 (1954), in which the bank accounts, comprised of money
originally belonging to the wife, were alternative rather than joint, per-
mitting the husband "or" the wife to make withdrawals. There it was
held that the husband, who had murdered his wife, had no property rights
in the accounts, not because of the statute above referred to, but because
of 'the nature of the interests in the account.
Thus it is seen that in the principal case the murderer.had a vested
right under the contract with the savings and loan institution, and, in
the absence of a controlling statute, his crime did not divest him of those
rights.
The problem has been considered in only a few courts of last resort,
[Vol. 16
RECENT DECISIONS
but this view is supported in Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E. 2d 872
(1950), wherein the Illinois court, following Oleff v. HodaHp, supra,
held that a husband, who had allegedly killed his wife, was not deprived
of his vested right in the whole of the estate as surviving joint tenant. See
also similar cases involving tenancy by entireties. Beddingfield v. Estill &
Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907); Smith v. Greenburg,
121 Colo. 417, 218 P. 2d 514 (1950).
The opposite view has been taken by courts of a few other juris-
dictions, holding, that the survivor was divested of all legal title on the
grounds 'that a person shall not be permitted to profit by his own wrong.
In these cases, as in the instant case, no statute existed which controlled
the determination therein. Bierbauer v. Moran, 279 N.Y. Supp. 176,
244 App. Div. 87 (1935); In re Santourians Estate, 212 N.Y. Supp.
116, 125 Misc. 668 (1925). The New York courts in these cases rested
their decisions on grounds of public policy without mentioning, strangely
enough, the constitutional question of depriving the murderer of whatever
vested right he might have had in the property at the time. Also in In re
King's Estate, 261 Wis. 266, 52 N.W. 2d 885 (1952), where the
husband murdered his wife and then committed suicide, the court held
that the wife's status as joint tenant continued in her administrator and
heirs at law who succeeded to the entire interest. See also Vesey v. Vesey,
supra, where a constructive trust was imposed upon the entire property
for the benefit of the victim's estate.
Between these two extreme views are modifications of both. Some
courts have permitted the wrongdoer to succeed to full ownership and
then have imposed upon him a constructive trust for the benefit of the
victim's -heirs, reserving to him an interest equal to, but no larger than,
that which he enjoyed prior to his murderous act. Bryant v. Bryant,
193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927); Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55,
93 A. 2d 345 (1952); Colton v. Wade, - Del. -, 80 A. 2d 923
(1951). See also 3 Scorr, TRUsTs §493.2 (1939).
Still other jurisdictions permit the murderer to take some interest
less than the whole, such as a one-half interest, or require that his estate
be reduced to a tenancy in common with the heirs of the deceased.
Barnet v. Covey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W. 2d 757 (1930); .Ashwood
v. Patterson, - Fla. -, 49 So. 2d 848 (1951); Hogan v. Martin, -
Fla. -, 52 So. 2d 806 (1951).
The court's decision in the instant case appears entirely proper under
existing law. Morally speaking, however, the result is at least to a degree
opprobrious. The fact remains that the wrongdoer did benefit from his
crime. He succeeded to the entire interest of that which he formerly
held but jointly with his victim, who, but for this wrong, might have out-
lived the murderer and succeeded to this interest or might have, during
her life, made future withdrawals from the account. The remedy for
this situation is in the hands of the legislature. Although legislation
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could not constitutionally deprive the slayer of a vested right which he
owns in praesenti, it could prevent him from acquiring any additional
interest as a result of his crime. See Wade, Acquisition of Property by
Wilfully Killing Another-.A Statutory Solution, 49 HAtav. L. REV. 715
(1936).
Richard C. Pickett
TRIAL PRAC7ICE-SPECIAL VERDICTS-CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-
FAILURE TO FIND ON ALL ISSUES
Plaintiff sued defendant to recover damages resulting from defend-
ant's alleged negligence. After the cause was tried to a jury, plaintiff
requested a special verdict. The jury returned a special verdict which
contained, inter alia, the following statements:
1. Defendant could and should, in the exercise of ordinary
care, have ascertained that said kingpin was broken, and
should have replaced same.
2. Defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in said parti-
culars.
3. Each of the foregoing acts and omissions of the defendant
constituted negligence.
4. Plaintiff was not himself negligent.
On the basis of this special verdict, the court entered judgment for
plaintiff in the amount of $20,000. The court of appeals reversed on the
grounds that special verdict was insufficient because of failure to find on
all issues and that it contained conclusions of law which were prejudical
to the defendant. The case was certified to the supreme court on the
grounds that the court of appeals' judgment was in conflict with the case
of Wills v. Anchor Cartage and Storage Co., 38 Ohio App. 358, 176
N.E. 680 (1930). Held, the trial court was in error in overruling de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict and for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, and the court of appeals was in error in not entering
final judgment for the defendant since there was an absence of probative
evidence to establish defendant's negligence. The supreme court, how-
ever, approved the holding of the court of appeals on the special verdict
issues. Landon v. Lee Motors, 161 Ohio St. 82, 118 N.E. 2d 147
(1954).
OHIO REV. CODE §2315.14 (11420-14) states that "a special
verdict is one 'by which the jury finds facts only as established by the
evidence and it must so present such facts, but n6t the evidence to prove
them, that nothing remains for the court but to draw from the facts
-found, conclusions of law."
The position of Ohio courts on the matter of the inclusion of con-
clusions of law in a special verdict has not been entirely clear. The Wills
case, supra, used language that indicated that conclusions of law were
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essential to sustain a special verdict. The court said, "Failure of special
verdict to find whether operators of stalled motor trucks were negligent
in not placing warning lights at crest of the hill, and whether such
negligence proximately caused the collision, render special verdict in-
sufficient." The court further stated, "In order to render judgment in
this case the trial judge would be required to usurp the function of the
jury on these two important questions." One year later the Ohio Supreme
Court held that such conclusions of law in a special verdict were im-
proper. In Dowd-Feder Co. v. Schreyer, 124 Ohio St. 504, 179 N.E.
411 (1931), which the principal case cited with approval, the court held,
"A finding 'by the jury that a certain act of the defendant constitutes
negligence and that it proximately caused the injury, would be tanta-
mount to a general verdict and conclusive of the case." The court goes
on to state, "A finding that one party was negligent and the other was
not, would be a mere conclusion of law and that clearly is not within
the province of the jury to determine in a special verdict."
Prior to the principal case the law in Ohio was that the court should
render judgment upon the pleadings and special verdict, disregarding any
legal conclusions contained in the special verdict. Dowd-Feder Co. v.
Schreyer, supra; Noseda v. Delmul, 123 Ohio St. 647, 176 N.E. 571
(1931). This would indicate that such legal conclusions, although of
no assistance in supporting the verdict, would not invalidate it so long
as no inconsistency appeared. In the principal case, however, the supreme
court held, "There was such a usurpation of the province of the court by
the jury in its special verdict that it practically constituted an argument
to the court for a rendition of a judgment for the plaintiff." The in-
clusion in the special verdict of conclusions of law, the court held,
"... was improper and cannot be regarded as non-prejudicial to the
defendant." This reasoning is based upon the Ohio statute, supra, which
states that the jury shall find the "facts only", and the Dowd-Feder
case, supra, which held "It is the duty of the trial court to require con-
formance with the provision of section 11420-14, General Code, in the
preparation of the special verdict, whether it be in the narrative or inter-
rogatory form. It must so present the facts found, 'but not the evidence
to prove them, that nothing remains for the court but to draw from the
facts found, conclusions of law.'" The court in the principal case held,
"The special verdict returned by the jury in this cause illustrates the
grave danger, in preparation of a special verdict, of a failure to submit
a form thereon in strict conformance with the statute." Thus, the
principal case, although approving the Dowd-Feder case, added the
qualification that conclusions of law may be regarded as prejudicial to
the opposing party and cannot merely be disregarded by the court in
applying the law to the facts found. Although the court did not say un-
equivocally that the inclusion of a single conclusion of law in a special
verdict is a fatal flaw, it did hold that such conclusions may render the
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special verdict defective if their use is flagrant and abusive of the purpose
of such verdicts. The court reiterated the statement in the Dowd-Feder
case, which placed the burden of screening out conclusions of law upon
the trial court.
A second and perhaps more important change in the Ohio law may
have been made by the principal case. The court said, "It is error for a
court to enter judgment on a special verdict which is not clear, consistent,
and complete, and which omits a finding of ultimate facts on any issue,
the determination of which is necessary to support such judgment." The
Ohio statute says, "When requested by either party the court shall direct
the jury to give a special verdict in writing upon any issues which the case
presents." OHIo REv. CODE §2315.15 (11420-16). Prior to the prin-
cipal case, when the jury did not find on a particular issue, the rule was
said to be that the party with the burden of proof on such issue had not
met his burden. Hayes et au v. Smith, 15 Ohio Cir. Ct. 300, 8 Ohio Cir.
Dec. 92 (1892) stated, "The absence of an affirmative finding as to any
issue amounts to a finding against the party with the burden as to such
issue, and hence the implied finding on that issue of contributory negli-
gence is against the plaintiff in error." In the Noseda case, supra, similar
language was used: "A special verdict is not invalid because there is not
a finding of ultimate facts on all the issues. When certain of the issues
are not determined they are to be regarded as not proved by the party
which has the burden of proof upon those issues." Using the doctrine of
the Noseda case, since there was an absence of a finding of ultimate
fact on the issue of contributory negligence in the principal case, and
since the defendant had the burden of proof on this issue, the court would
have presumed that the defendant had not met his burden of proving
contributory negligence. But the principal case held the special verdict to
be defective because the jury did not make sufficient findings on the im-
portant issue of contributory negligence.
Although the language in the principal case seems to conflict with
the language of the Noseda case, the actual holdings are not inconsistent.
In the Noseda case the jury made.special findings from which it followed
as a matter of law that defendant was not negligent. The judgment en-
tered was for the defendant. That judgment could be supported by the
finding without the aid of any presumption as to issues not found. When
the jury found defendant not negligent no other findings were required
and the jury never reached the issue of contributory negligence. Hubbard
v. C., C. & C. Highway, Inc., 81 Ohio App. 445, 450, 76 N.E. 8d 721,
723 (1947). The principal case seems to be the first one in which a pre-
sumption that the jury made, but did not express, a finding against the
defendant on the issue of contributory negligence would have been in-
dispensable to support the judgment for plaintiff on the special verdict.
Despite the broad language of the prior cases, the opinion in the instant
case refused to carry the presumption so far. The rule now seems to be
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that where the judgment actually turns on the issue not found, the pre-
sumption of a finding will not be made in order to support a judgment
for either party.
John F. McCarthy
TORTS-LiABILrrY OF CONSTRUCTION SUBCONTRACTOR-
WORK TURNED OVER TO CONTRACTOR
A plumbing company had a contract to do work for a housing de-
velopment. The ditch work was subcontracted to Webb who in turn
subcontracted it to the defendant who agreed to dig a sfraight ditch thirty
inches wide from the sewer to the basement of each house. The contract
was silent as to any sloping, shoring, or bracing of the ditch wall.
Defendant dug the ditch, removed his machinery, and turned the
premises over to the plumbing company. Two hours later an employee
of the plumbing company was killed by a cave-in while working in the
ditch. Decedent's administratrix instituted an action predicated on com-
mon law negligence. The trial court directed a verdict for defendant.
On appeal, held, affirmed. Since defendant had turned the premises over
to the plumbing company and had performed according to the terms of
the contract he was not liable. Sumner 4dm'x. v. Lambert 96 Ohio
App. 53,- N.E.2d - (1953).
In reaching this decision the Court follows the prevailing view
stated in 65 C. J. S., NEGLIGENCE 613 as follows: "Where the work of
an independent contractor is complete, turned over to, and accepted by the
owner, the contractor is not liable to third persons for injuries suffered
by reason of the condition of the work." This rule is based upon a
common misinterpretation of the case of Winterbottom v. Wright 10
M. & W. 109, 11 L. J. Ex. 415 (1842). See PROSSER, ToRTs 673
(1941), which held that no action could be founded upon a contract to
repair a stagecoach by a person who was injured but who was not a
party to the contract. It should be noted that in that case the action was
brought in contract, not tort. The Winterbottom case became the basis
of a rule that a "contractor, manufacturer, vendor, or furnisher of an
article is not liable to third persons who have no contractual relations with
him for negligence in the construction, manufacture, or sale of the
article." 2 COOLEY, TORTS 1486 (1932).
Exceptions to the rule were soon announced in cases involving
manufacturers, such as: (1) Where -the seller had knowledge that the
chattel was dangerous and a third person was injured, Langridge v.
Levy 2 M. & W. 519, aff'd 4 M. & W. 338, 6 L. J. Ex. 137 (1837)
(express misrepresentation as to the safety of a gun); and (2) where
the article was inherently dangerous to human safety, Huset v. J. I. Case
Co. 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903) (defective threshing machine), or
health, Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852) (careless labeling
of a poison as a drug). Finally from MacPherson v. Buick 217 N.Y.
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382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) emerged a rule which has been adopted by
RESTATEMENT, TORTS §394, as follows. "A manufacturer who fails
to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a chattel which, unless
carefully made, he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk
of causing substantial bodily harm to those who may lawfully use it for a
purpose for which it was manufactured and to those whom the supplier
should expect to be in the vicinity of its probable use is subject to liability
for bodily harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a
purpose for which it was manufactured."
Generally speaking, the MacPherson rule has not been extended to
hold a construction or building contractor liable to third parties for
negligence in the construction of the structure after acceptance of the
work by the owner or prime contractor. Roman Catholic Church, Diocese
of Tuscon v. Keinan, 74 Ariz. 20, 243 P 2d 455, aff'd on rehearing,
244 P 2d 351 (1952). Other decisions have revealed a gradual limita-
tion of the non-liability rule and certain exceptions have been recognized
in the following situations. (1) Vhere the construction is imminently
or inherently dangerous, Hale v. Depaoli 33 Cal. 2d 228, 291 P. 2d 1
(1948) (defective porch railing); (2) where the contractor has actual
or constructive knowledge of the danger involved, Colbert v. Holland
Furnace Co. 241 Ill. App. 583, aftEd, 333 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 162 (1926)
(installation of defective cold air duct in floor); and (3) where the
construction is a nuisance per se, Brown v. Welsbach Corp. 301 N.Y.
202; 93 N.E.2d 640 (1950) (four foot hole negligently left in side-
walk).
Many cases which deny recovery quote the old rule that there is no
privity of contract between the person injured and defendants. Ford v.
Sturges, 56 App. D.C. 361, 14 F. 2d 253 (1926). Others state that
the owner's negligence is the proximate cause and the original negligence
of the contractor is the remote cause, relieving the contractor of liability.
Howard v. Reinhart Donovan Co. 196 Okla. 506, 166 T. 2d 101
(1946). These cases should be contrasted with the following statement:
"The contractor for his own economic benefit is engaging in an affirmative
course of conduct which may affect the interests of others; that injury to
those who come in contact with the finished work is to be anticipated if
it is negligently done; and that the obligee's reliance on the contractor
may be expected to endanger others from preventing him from taking
precautions for their protection." See PROSSER, ToRTS 695 (1941).
The basic legal principles governing the liability of a building or
construction contractor for negligence to third persons after acceptance
of the work by the owner should be the same as those principles involved
in holding a manufacturer liable to third persons not in contractual
privity with the manufacturer. There are, however, material consider-
ations applicable to the construction contractor, and not to the manu-
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facturer, which may outweigh the factors in favor of liability. A con-
tractor often works under specifications furnished by the owner or his
architect, while the manufacturer does not ordinarily act as a contractor
with the intermediate dealer. Furthermore, the manufacturer ordinarily
selects his own raw materials and builds the product according to his own
plans. Travis v. RochesterBridge Co. 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1. (1919).
See generally 13 ALR 2d 195.
It is true that the contract in this case made no mention of safety
requirements, and that defendant performed according to its terms; but
it is submitted that this in itself is insufficient to warrant a directed verdict.
The contract should be considered by the jury with all the other evidence
to determine whether defendant was negligent.
Thurl R. Blume
TORTS-PARENT AND CHILD--
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AGAINST PARENT
Defendant's minor son negligently caused the death of defendant's
infant daughter while using the "family purpose" automobile. The
personal representative of the deceased child sued the child's father for
wrongful death. In the trial court judgment was entered on the verdict
for the representative. On appeal, held, reversed. The Kentucky con-
stitutional and statutory provisions which authorize death claims by a
decedent's personal representatives do not create any new cause of action,
but merely extend the same cause the injured party would have had if he
had survived, and the daughter, who was an unemancipated minor, would
have had no cause of action against her father. Harralson v. Thomas,
- Ky. -, 269 S.W.2d 276 (1954).
In arriving at its decision the court concluded that KENTUCKY
CONSTITUTION, §241 and KENTUCKY REVISED STATUTES §411.130
authorizing the assertion of a claim on behalf of the decedent's personal
representative, as interpreted by Kentucky courts, merely extend beyond
his death substantially the same cause of action the injured party may
have had if he had survived. Louisqille Ry. Co. v. Raymond's ldm'r.,
135 Ky. 738, 123 S.W.281 (1909). Thus the question resolved was
whether the infant child would have had the right to sue her father had
she lived. The court determined that "a general public policy, in the
absence of legislation changing it, justifies denial of the right of a minor
child to sue its parent for such a tort."
In the English Common Law there are no reported cases which
recognize the immunity of a parent from a suit in tort against him by his
minor child. See note, 19 A.L.R.2d 425 (1951). The first American
case to establish the rule soon to be followed in this country was
Hewellette v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891). There the
court denied the claim of an unemancipated minor against her mother
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in an action for false imprisonment, basing its decision on "the peace of
society... and a sound public polidy, designed to subserve the repose of
families and the 'best interests of society.... ." Today, by the great weight
of authority, an unemancipated minor may not maintain a suit for damages
against the parent in tort. See 39 AM. JuR., PARENT AND CHIMD §§89,
90. An extreme application of this rule is illustrated in a case denying
to a daughter who had been ravished 'by her father the right of redress
for damages suffered. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788
(1905).
Nevertheless, certain inroads have been made limiting the appli-
cation of this general rule. No disability exists as to a minor who has
been emancipated. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Ad. 905
(1930); Wood -u. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A.2d 586 (1948).
Another exception, although not widely accepted, has been made in
the case of wilful or malicious torts by the parent against the child. In the
case of Mahke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951), a six
year old infant was allowed recovery for injuries occasioned by her
witnessing her father's murder of her mother and his own suicide a
week later. The court held that where a parent is guilty of acts which
show a complete abandonment of the parental relation, he forfeits his
immunity from suit. Also, the personal representative of an unemanci-
pated minor child was permitted to recover from the personal repre-
sentative of the father where the father compelled the child to ride in an
automobile driven by the father, while intoxicated, over a mountainous
highway at night and 'both were killed. The basis, again, was wilful mis-
conduct in clear abandonment of parental duty. Cogwill v. Boock, 189
Ore. 282, 218 P.2d 445 (1950).
A further exception to the general rule of immunity recognized by
some courts is a situation in which the tort occurred while the father was
acting in his business or vocational capacity. Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St.
566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952); Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra; Worrell v.
Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939).
Some courts, in refusing to apply the immunity rule, have done so
where the parent is protected 'by liability insurance and the ultimate
liability is on the insurer. Dunlap v. Dunlap, supra; Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932). These decisions consider that when
the parent is insured, the "public policy" or "domestic tranquility" argu-
ment fails. The majority of the courts, however, have rejected this
reasoning on the idea that the fact that the party being sued is insured
"ought not to create a cause of action where none exists otherwise."
Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (1948); Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark.
832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Mesite v. Kirchenstein, 109 Conn. 77,
145 Atl. 753 (1929). The court in the instant case considered this
problem of insurance, but followed the majority and stated that any
change was a matter for legislative action.
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Although there is apparently no Ohio case precisely in point, there
is no doubt that Ohio would have reached the same result in the case of
a similar suit by a deceased child's personal representative against a parent
who committed the tort. Notice that in the instant case the defendant's
son committed the tort for which the father would otherwise have 'been
liable. However, the family purpose doctrine does not exist in Ohio, and
the parent would not be liable unless the minor, in negligently driving the
car, was acting in the capacity of an agent or servant of the parent,
Elms v. Flick, 100 Ohio St. 180, 126 N.E. 66 (1919); or unless the
minor was under 18 years of age and his driver's license application was
signed by such parent. OHIO REv. CODE §4507.07 (6296-10).
Otherwise, there is little doubt that the parent would be immune
from suit because, (1) the Ohio statute expressly provides that actions
shall survive only in those cases in which the party injured would have
been entitled to maintain an action and recover damages if death had
not ensued, OHIO REv. CODE §2125.01 (10509-166); and, (2) Ohio
follows the general rule that an unemancipated minor cannot recover
damages for injuries caused by the negligence of a parent. Krohngold
v. Krohngold, 12 OHIO L. ABs. 631, 181 N.E. 910 (1932); Cannen
v. Kroft, 41 Ohio App. 120, 180 N.E. 277 (1931).
The decision of the Kentucky court in the instant case is in accord
with the weight of authority in this area.
Richard C. Pickett
WRONGFUL DEATH-INTERPRETATION OF "CHILDREN"
IN WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE-STATUS
OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
This case includes an action by an illegitimate infant to recover
damages for the wrongful death of his alleged father. The plaintiff was
born eight and one-half months after his putative father was killed in
an automobile accident. At the trial the plaintiff introduced evidence
tending to show that his mother and decedent were engaged to be married
and that decedent had acknowledged the unborn child to be his. The
court ruled that plaintiff was not entitled to recover as the evidence was
insufficient to support the claim that decedent was father of the plaintiff.
The appeal was on the question of law as to whether a child, born out of
wedlock after the death of his reputed father, could be a beneficiary under
OHIO GEN. CODE §10509.167 (OHIO REv. CODE §2125.02) which
provides that recovery in an action for wrongful death "shall be for the
exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse, the children, and other next of
kin of the decedent." Held, the word "children" as used in OHIO GEN.
CODE §10509.167 refers to legitimate children. Bonewit v. Weber, 95
Ohio App. 428, 120 N.E. 2d 738 (1954).
At common law there was no civil action for the death of a person.
Baker v. Bolton, (1808) 1 Campb. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033; PROSSER,
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TORTS 955 (1941), but such an action was created in 1846 by Lord
Campbell's Act, 9 & 10 Vict., C. 93. A similar statute has been enacted
in every state in the Union. HARPER, ToRTS, 606 (1933). There is
however, conflict in the various jurisdictions as to the proper construction
to be used in applying these wrongful death statutes.
One line of authority, holding that "children," and "next of kin,"
in a statute means only legitimate children and next of kin, was estab-
lished by an interpretation of Lord Campbell's Act in Dickinson v.
Northeastern Ry. Co., 2 Hurl & C. 735, 159 Eng. Rep. 304 (1863).
This decision was based on the old common law principle that a bastard
"cannot be an heir to anyone, neither can he have heirs but of his own
body; for being a nullius filius, he is therefore kin to nobody ..
1 BL. COMM. 459, also 2 KENT COMM. (13th Ed.) 212.
States following the view taken by the principal case, in the absence
of any explanations, definitions, or qualifications, include the following:
Georgia, Brinkley v. Dixe Construction Co., 205 Ga. 415, 54 S.E. 2d
267 (1949), (the word "child" or "children" in wrongful death statute
means a legitimate child or children); Indiana, McDonald v. Pittsburgh,
C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 144 Ind. 459, 43 N.E. 447 (1896) (a bastard
is not a child within meaning of wrongful death statute); Louisiana,
Brown v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 18 La. App. 656, 138 So. 221 (1932)
(statute authorizes death act benefits only to actual and legitimate rela-
tives); Maryland, Washington, B & A.R. Co. v. State, 136 Md. 103,
111 Ad. 164 (1920) (the word "child" in wrongful death statute means
legitimate child); Pennsylvania, Molz v. Hanselh, 115 Pa. Super. 338,
175 Ad. 880 (1934) (term "children" in statute authorizing recovery
for wrongful death means legitimate children).
The other line of authority holds that remedial statutes should be
liberally construed so the word "children" or "next of kin" in wrongful
death statutes include illegitimates. Among the states adopting this view
are Florida, Hadley v. City of Tallahassee, 67 Fla. 436, 65 So. 545
(1914) ("any minor child" in wrongful death statutes includes illegiti-
mates); Mississippi, Wheeler v. Southern Railway, 11 Miss. 528, 71 So.
812 (1916) (mother of illegitimate child allowed to recover as his "next
of kin"); Missouri, Marshall v. Wabash Ry. Co., 120 Mo. 275, 255
S.W. 179 (1894) (mother permitted to recover for death of illegitimate
son); Virginia, Withrow v. Edwards, 181 Va. 344, 25 S.E. 2d 343
(1943) (illegitimate permitted to recover as "child" for death of father
under wrongful death statute); Wisconsin, Andrzejewski v. North-
western Fuel Co., 158 Wis. 170, 148 N.W. 37 (1914) (mother re-
covered for death of illegitimate under statute for benefit of "lineal
ancestors"); Washington, Goldmeyer v. Van Bibber, 130 Wash. 8, 225
Pac. 821 (1924) (mother of an illegitimate child may recover under
statute permitting recovery for the death of a "child"); Texas, Galveston,
H. & S.A. Ry. Co. v. Walker et al, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 52, 106 S.W.
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705 (1908) (statute giving cause of action for death of mother to
"children" embraces her illegitimate children). South Carolina formerly
entertained the other view, McDonald v. Southern Railway, 71 S.C. 352,
51 S.E. 138 (1905), but shortly thereafter enacted a statute giving
illegitimates the same rights as any other persons under the wrongful
death act. Acts. 1906 p. 156, Section 3. This statute was upheld in
Croft v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 83 S.C. 232, 65 S.E. 216 (1909).
Also in Middleton v. Luckenbach, 70 F. 2d 326 (1934) ("child" in
statute providing for recovery for wrongful death on the high seas in-
cludes illegitimate children).
In Ohio the wrongful death statute of 1851 (2 Curwen 1673)
which provided that, ". . . every such action, shall be for the exclusive
benefit of the widow and next of kin . . ." was construed to include
illegitimates, the court saying it is error to order nonsuit on the ground
that such child is illegitimate, and the fact of the child's legitimacy or
illegitimacy could in no respect affect the right of action in his behalf.
Veronica Muhl's Ydm'r. v. Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 10 Ohio St. 272
(1855). A fairly recent appellate court case, State v. H.V. Mining Co.,
73 Ohio App. 483, 57 N.E. 2d 236 (1944), construed the Workmen's
Compensation statute, OnIo GEN. CODE §1465.82 (OHio REv. CODE
§4123.59) as including illegitimates within the word "child." In doing
so the court refused to follow Staker, Adm'r v. Industrial Commission of
Ohio, 127 Ohio St. 13, 186 N.E. 616 (1933), which said the word
"child" in the Workmen's Compensation statute meant only legitimate
children. The latter case was held not controlling, as construction of the
statute was not in issue. Owens v. Humbert, Ex'rx., 5 Ohio App. 312
(1916), held the word "child" in the descent and distribution statute,
OHIO GEN. CODE §10584 (OHIo REv. CODE §2107.52), to mean only
legitimate children as did Creisar v. The State of Ohio, 97 Ohio St. 16,
119 N.E. 128 (1917), in construing a non-support statute.
The court in the principal case could have followed either line of
authority, since there was precedent both within Ohio and elsewhere.
From a policy standpoint there seems to be no reason for denying illegiti-
mate children the protection and privileges afforded others. The decision
can be justified in this particular case because there was not sufficient
proof that decedent was the father, but the holding will preclude an
illegitimate from recovering in any instance, even for the wrongful
death of a mother. This seems to be unfortunate, since an illegitimate
probably needs this protection even more than others.
Jesse Cole, Jr.
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